When he is talking about the character or disposition that falls between obsequiousness or flattery on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other, he says that this state: Cooper argues that this indicates: Types[ edit ] Aristotle divides friendships into three types, based on the motive for forming them: Friendships of utility are relationships formed without regard to the other person at all.
Meaning and the Problem of Universals, A Kant-Friesian Approach One of the most durable and intractable issues in the history of philosophy has been the problem of universals. Closely related to this, and a major subject of debate in 20th century philosophy, has been the problem of the nature of the meaning.
The problem of universals goes back to Plato and Aristotle. The matter at issue is that, on the one hand, the objects of experience are individual, particular, and concrete, while, on the other hand, the objects of thought, or most of the kinds of things that we know even about individuals, are general and abstract, i.
Thus, a house may be red, but there are many other red things, so redness is a general property, a universal. There are also many houses, and even kinds of houses, so the nature of being a house is general and universal also.
Redness can also be conceived in the abstract, separate from any particular thing, but it cannot exist in experience except as a property of some particular thing and it cannot even be imagined except with some other minimal properties, e.
Abstraction is especially conspicuous in mathematics, where numbers, geometrical shapes, and equations are studied in complete separation from experience.
The question that may be asked, then, is how it is that general kinds and properties or abstract objects are related to the world, how they exist in or in relation to individual objects, and how it is that we know them when experience only seems to reveal individual, concrete things.
Plato's answer to this was that universals exist in a separate reality as special objects, distinct in kind, from the things of experience. This is Plato's famous theory of "Forms. Plato concludes that what we "look upon" as a model, and is not an object of experience, is some other kind of real object, which has an existence elsewhere.
That "elsewhere" is the "World of Forms," to which we have only had access, as the Myth of Chariot in the Phaedrus says, before birth, and which we are now only remembering. Later, the Neoplatonists decided that we have access now, immediately and intuitively, to the Forms, but while this produces a rather different kind of theory, both epistemologically and metaphysically, it still posits universals as objects at a higher level of reality than the objects of experience which partake of matter and evil.
Plato himself realized, as recounted in the Parmenides, that there were some problems and obscurities with his theory. Some of these could be dismissed as misunderstandings; others were more serious.
Most important, however, was the nature of the connection between the objects of experience and the Forms. Individual objects "participate" in the Forms and derive their character, even, Plato says in the Republictheir existence, from the Forms, but it is never clear how this is supposed to work if the World of Forms is entirely separate from the world of experience that we have here.
In the Timaeus, Plato has a Creator God, the "Demiurge," fashioning the world in the image of the Forms, but this cannot explain the on-going coming-into-being of subsequent objects that will "participate" themselves. Plato's own metaphorical language in describing the relationship, that empirical objects are "shadows" of the Forms, probably suggested the Neoplatonic solution that such objects are attenuated emanations of Being, like dim rays of sunlight at some distance from the source.
Whether we take Plato's theory or the Neoplatonic version, there is no doubt that Plato's kind of theory about universals is one of Realism: Universals have real existence, just as much so, if not more so, than the individual objects of experience.
Aristotle also had a Realistic theory of universals, but he tried to avoid the problems with Plato's theory by not separating the universals, as objects, from the objects of experience.
He "immanentized" the Forms. This meant, of course, that there still were Forms; it was just a matter of where they existed. This word is more familiar to us in its Latin translation: In modern discussion, however, it is usually just called the "form" of the object.
The Aristotelian "form" of an object, however, is not just what an object "looks" like. An individual object as an individual object is particular, not universal.
The "form" of the object will be the complex of all its abstract features and properties. If the object looks red or looks round or looks ugly, then those features, as abstractions, belong to the "form.
To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. Since everything that we can identify about an object, the kind of thing it is, what it is doing, where it is, etc. By contrast, the "matter" represents the potential or possibility of an object to have other properties.
These uses of "form" and "matter" are now rather different from what is familiar to us. Aristotelian "matter" is not something that we can see, so it is not what we usually mean by matter today. Similarly, Aristotelian "form" is not some superficial appearance of a fundamentally material object: It is the true actuality and existence of the object.
The abstract "form" of an object, the universal in it, Aristotle called "secondary substance.
Aristotle postulated a certain mental function, "abstraction," by which the universal is comprehended or thought in the particular. This is the equivalent of understanding what is perceived, which means that we get to the meaning of the perception.
The "form" of the thing becomes its meaning, its concept, in the mind.James M. Stedman Aristotle’s Cardinal Virtues Practical Philosophy, , (web edition, ; originally published July ) 58 working to understand both the biological and psychological aspects of his.
Aristotle and Piety The Euthyphro is a much studied text of Plato’s, which unfortunately has left many people with some very serious questions.
Primarily, why . In Ethics, Aristotle argues the highest end is the human good, and claims that the highest end pursued in action is happiness. Aristotle also claims that happiness is achieved only by living a virtuous life - "our definition is in harmony with those who say that happiness is virtue, or a particular virtue; because an activity in accordance with virtue implies virtue.
The moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas () involves a merger of at least two apparently disparate traditions: Aristotelian eudaimonism and Christian theology.
On the one hand, Aquinas follows Aristotle in thinking that an act is good or bad depending on whether it contributes to or. It is this view on human nature that I intend to explain and discuss throughout this essay with reference to some more recent philosophers to show that Aristotle’s view was not only linked directly to Athenian society but has managed to stand the test of time.
Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta On the Essence and Actuality of nationwidesecretarial.comated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, This is a lecture course, "Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy", presented at the University of Freiburg during summer semester